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Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons 
from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things 
LAWRENCE J. TRAUTMAN* & PETER C. ORMEROD** 
Cyber breaches continue at an alarming pace with new 
vulnerability warnings an almost daily occurrence. Discov-
ery of the industrial virus Stuxnet during 2010 introduced a 
global threat of malware focused toward disruption of in-
dustrial control devices. By the year 2020, it is estimated that 
over 30 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices will exist. 
The IoT global market spend is estimated to grow from 
$591.7 billion in 2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a com-
pound annual growth rate of 17%. The installed base of IoT 
endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion in 2014 to more than 
25.6 billion in 2019. With this tremendous growth in both 
data and devices, a security nightmare appears more rea-
sonable than not. The proliferation of novel consumer de-
vices and increased Internet-dependent business and gov-
ernment data systems introduces vulnerabilities of unprece-
dented magnitude. This paper adds to our understanding of 
the development of cyber vulnerabilities resulting directly 
from: (1) the Stuxnet code and its progeny, and (2) wide-
spread malware exposure associated with the IoT. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to 
threaten our interests and advance their own, and despite improving 
cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks, 
and systems will be at risk for years. 
 
   Daniel R. Coats 
   Director of National Intelligence 
   May 11, 20171 
 
Cyber breaches continue at an alarming pace and new vulnera-
bility warnings are an almost daily occurrence.2 The following cat-
egories of U.S. infrastructure have been identified as critical to the 
well-being of the nation: information and communications; banking 
and finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipe-
lines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforce-
ment services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government ser-
vices; public health services; electric power, oil, and gas production; 
and storage.3 Discovery of the industrial virus Stuxnet during 2010 
introduced a global threat of malware that targets and destroys in-
dustrial control devices.4 
                                                                                                             
 1 Statement for the Record: Hearing on Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 
US Intelligence Community Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th 
Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence). 
 2 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233, 235 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cyber-
security Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 
3–4 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 345–47 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Following 
the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 
PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 810 (2017). 
 3 See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, PRESIDENTIAL 
POLICY DIRECTIVE—CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE 
(2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-
policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY]. 
 4 See Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR 
(Mar. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/stuxnet-
201104. 
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By the year 2020, experts estimate 30 billion Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices will exist.5 The IoT global market spend is estimated 
to “grow from $591.7 billion in 2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a 
compound annual growth rate of 17%.”6 And “[t]he installed base 
of IoT endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion in 2014 to more than 
25.6 billion in 2019.”7 With this tremendous growth in both data and 
devices, a security nightmare is far more likely than not. 
The proliferation of novel consumer devices and increased In-
ternet-dependent business and government data systems introduces 
vulnerabilities of unprecedented magnitude.8 Digital vulnerabilities 
touch upon a number of different areas of the law: privacy,9 risk 
management,10 corporate governance11 (including the duties of 
                                                                                                             
 5 See VERIZON, STATE OF THE MARKET: INTERNET OF THINGS 2016 3 (2016), 
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-things-
market-report-2016.pdf. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Trey Herr & Allan Friedman, Redefining Cybersecurity, 8 AM. 
FOREIGN POL’Y COUNCIL – DEF. TECH. PROGRAM BRIEF 1, 1–2 (2015); Daniel J. 
Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23–24 (2003). 
 9 See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data and the Future for 
Privacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 272, 283 (F. 
Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016); Corey Ciocchetti, The Privacy Ma-
trix, 12 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 249 (2007); Sasha Romanosky & Ales-
sandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Le-
gal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1064–65 (2009); Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590 (2014); Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be For-
gotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 269–70 (2012); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0) 3 (George 
Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 132, 2005). 
 10 See Liam M. D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance, 
3 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 8–9 (2014); Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Pri-
vacy, and Cyber Insurance, 6–7 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2017-
23, 2017). 
 11 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788 (2009); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-
Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 28 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 315–17 (2011); John Armour et al., 
Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement 9, 11–12 (John M. Olin Ctr. 
for Law, Econ., & Bus., Working Paper No. 644, 2009). 
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care,12 monitor,13 and disclosure14), breach notification,15 infor-
mation and data security,16 securities regulation,17 law of war,18 con-
stitutional provisions,19 and more.20 This Article adds to our under-
                                                                                                             
 12 See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2008); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1780–81 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of 
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2006). 
 13 See Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1154–55 (2010). 
 14 See Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, 3 
ASIA BUS. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2001); Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? 
Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1601, 1614–15 (2012); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security 
and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government 
Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1344–45 (2006). 
 15 See Dana J. Lesemann, Once More unto the Breach: An Analysis of Legal, 
Technological, and Policy Issues Involving Data Breach Notification Statutes, 4 
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 203, 206–08 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Jan-
ger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 918, 923–25 
(2007); Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009); Fabio Bisogni, Evaluating Data Breach 
Notification Laws. What Do the Numbers Tell Us? 2 (Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2236144. 
 16 See Ian Brown et al., Information Security and Cybercrime, in LAW AND 
THE INTERNET 671, 671 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3d ed. 2009); 
Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Infor-
mation, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111, 111 (Anupam Chander 
et al. eds., 2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Sur-
prising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1708–11 (2010); Rich-
ard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Defending Our Data: The Need for Information 
We Do Not Have 1–2 (Aug. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2816010; Josephine Wolff, Models for Cybersecurity Incident Infor-
mation Sharing and Reporting Policies 3 (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manu-
script), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587398. 
 17 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Secu-
rities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 732–37 (2006); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Ma-
terial Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and Secu-
rities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 136–37 (2005); Robert B. Thomp-
son & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections 
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869–70 (2003); Lawrence J. Trautman 
& George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & the Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 
68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262, 262–63 (2014). 
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standing of the development of cyber vulnerabilities resulting di-
rectly from: (1) the Stuxnet code and its progeny, and (2) widespread 
malware exposure associated with the IoT. 
This Article proceeds in eight parts. First, we provide an over-
view of the industrial cyber vulnerability problem. Second, we ex-
plain a chief problem: digital vulnerabilities in industrial systems. 
Third, we relate a diverse variety of sources of cybersecurity-related 
legal obligations—including corporate duties, data privacy statutes, 
and consumer-protection litigation, among others. Fourth is a dis-
cussion of the history of the Stuxnet malware—which targeted a 
ubiquitous, industrial-control device called programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs)—and implications for the future. Fifth, we ex-
amine the recent development of the Internet of things—its current 
status, known vulnerabilities, and likely future. Sixth is a discussion 
of continued exposure of intelligence agency’s cyber toolsets. Sev-
enth, we suggest topics for future research. We then conclude with 
some final thoughts. 
                                                                                                             
 18 See DANIEL SUI ET AL., WILSON CTR. SCI. & TECH. INNOVATION 
PROGRAM, THE DEEP WEB AND THE DARKNET: A LOOK INSIDE THE INTERNET’S 
MASSIVE BLACK BOX 11–12 (2015); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or 
Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in 
CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 191–93 (Jens David 
Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); Steven M. Bellovin et al., Limiting the Undesired Impact 
of Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications, 3 J. 
CYBERSECURITY 59, 60 (2017); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical 
National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 209–12 (2002); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The 
Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber 
Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 189, 224–25 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Un-
packing the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the 
Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 25–27 (2016); Eric Talbot 
Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2–3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932110. 
 19 See Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of 
the Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 
ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15). 
 20 See TREY HERR ET AL., BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, THE 
CYBER SECURITY PROJECT, TAKING STOCK: ESTIMATING VULNERABILITY 
REDISCOVERY (2017) (discussing vulnerabilities in software). 
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II. THE INDUSTRIAL CYBER VULNERABILITY PROBLEM 
What we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing a lot of 
infiltrations . . . and then the next step is, again, the disruptive, dis-
abling, destructive types of attacks. And so . . . electric grids, water 
treatment facilities . . . mass transportation systems . . . railways and 
trains, whatever — if those intruders get into those systems and then 
can determine how they can in fact interfere in the command and 
control systems of these systems, they . . . could . . . put trains onto 
the same tracks. They can . . . bring down electric grids . . . . 
 
John Brennan 
Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counter-terrorism; Former Director, Central Intelligence 
Agency21 
    
Critical infrastructure is defined in the USA PATRIOT Act22 as 
“systems and assets, . . . physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic se-
curity, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
                                                                                                             
 21 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 230, 254–55 (2016) (quoting Ritika Singh, Transcript of John 
Brennan’s Speech on Yemen and Drones, LAWFARE (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/transcript-of-john-brennans-speech-at-the-
council-on-foreign-relations). 
 22 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 2001 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 272 (2001). 
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matters.”23 It was Presidential Decision Directive 63 (or PDD-63)24 
that identified the requirement to protect the following critical infra-
structures: “information and communications; banking and finance; 
water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and 
waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement services; 
emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public 
health services; electric power, oil and gas production; and stor-
age.”25 The following four activities controlled by the federal gov-
ernment were specifically identified by PDD-63: “(1) internal secu-
rity and federal law enforcement; (2) foreign intelligence; (3) for-
eign affairs; and (4) national defense.”26 
The Obama Administration issued PPD-21, or Critical Infra-
structure Security and Resilience, in February 2013.27 PPD-21 di-
rected the federal government to “work with critical infrastructure 
owners and operators . . . to take proactive steps to manage risk and 
strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infra-
structure, considering all hazards that could have a debilitating im-
pact on national security, economic stability, [or] public health and 
safety.”28 
                                                                                                             
 23 Id. § 1016(e); see RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44410, 
CYBERSECURITY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS AND 
RESOURCES 1 n.1 (2017) (“This included causing catastrophic health effects or 
mass casualties comparable to those from the use of weapons of mass destruction; 
impairing federal agencies’ abilities to perform essential missions or ensure the 
public’s health and safety; undermining state and local government capacities to 
maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services; damaging the pri-
vate sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy; having 
a negative effect on the economy through cascading disruption of other infrastruc-
tures; or undermining the public’s morale and confidence in our national eco-
nomic and political institution. HSPD-7 has since been superseded by PDD-21.”); 
see also Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; Critical Infrastructure Iden-
tification, Prioritization, and Protection, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 
17, 2003), https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7 (de-
scribing the asset loss impact level necessary to deem the asset as “critical”). 
 24 Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Sector Coordinators, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,804 (Aug. 5, 1998). 
 25 See TEHAN, supra note 23, at 1. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. (citing PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, supra 
note 3). 
 28 PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, supra note 3. 
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On May 11, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order 
intended to improve the federal government’s cybersecurity and 
protect critical infrastructure from digital attacks.29 The most “nota-
ble changes” include requiring “heads of federal agencies [to] use a 
framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to assess and manage cyber risk, and prepare a report 
within 90 days documenting how they will implement it.”30 
Unlike most other nations, in the United States the private sector 
owns and operates an estimated 90% of the nation’s critical infra-
structure.31 Other significant elements of U.S. critical national infra-
structure include those maintained by federal agencies, such as air 
traffic control systems, and materials handling operations, such as 
mail sorting by the U.S. Postal Service.32 
A. Industrial Control Systems 
Industrial control systems (ICS) are ripe targets for digital at-
tack. ICS include: “supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other 
control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Control-
lers (PLC).”33 These control systems are vital to the functionality of 
the U.S. critical infrastructures, which “are often highly intercon-
nected and mutually dependent systems.”34 
ICS are used in a wide swath of industries, including: “electric, 
water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, transportation, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete 
manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods).”35 
                                                                                                             
 29 Dustin Volz, Trump Signs Order Aimed at Upgrading Government Cyber 
Defenses, REUTERS (May 11, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trump-cyber-idUSKBN1872L9. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
SPECIAL PUB. 800-82, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY 
1 (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
82r2.pdf (rev. 2) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ICS SECURITY]. 
 32 See id.; see Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last updated July 11, 2017). 
 33 GUIDE TO ICS SECURITY, supra note 31, at 1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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Generally, SCADA systems are “used to control dispersed assets us-
ing centralized data acquisition and supervisory control.”36 DCS are 
“used to control production systems within a local area such as a 
factory using supervisory and regulatory control.”37 Finally, PLCs 
are “used for discrete control for specific applications and generally 
provide regulatory control.”38 
Cyber threats initially did not pose a risk to ICS, because “ICS 
were [typically] isolated systems running proprietary control proto-
cols using specialized hardware and software” and their “compo-
nents were in physically secured areas and the components were not 
connected to IT networks or systems.”39 But as the Internet Protocol 
devices proliferate and decrease in price, they have begun to replace 
proprietary ICS components—significantly increasing vulnerabili-
ties to digital attacks.40 
B. Vulnerabilities Escalate 
By the first quarter of 2017, an all-time high number of disclosed 
vulnerabilities had been reached.41 Risk Based Security observes: 
“While no significant increase occurred from 2014 to 2016, the 
number of disclosed vulnerabilities jumped (29.2%) in Q1 2017.”42 
Risk Based Security also notes that if this trend continues, then 2017 
is on “the path to become a record-breaking year in the number of 
vulnerabilities disclosed!”43 Exhibit 1 below provides a comparison 







                                                                                                             
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See RISK BASED SEC., VULNERABILITY QUICKVIEW: FIRST QUARTER 2017 
VULNERABILITY TRENDS 3 (2017). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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Exhibit 1 
A Comparison of First Quarter 2017 




Source: Risk Based Security, Inc. 
 
Statistics for the first quarter of 2017 reveal that the largest target 
of attack traffic is the United States, “with Brazil in second place for 
the second quarter in a row,” and the United Kingdom in third.45 
Furthermore, “[a]ttacks targeting the U.S. were down 9%, while 
Brazil saw a nearly 46% increase in web application attacks . . . and 
the U.K. a 30% gain.”46 Exhibit 2 depicts the Top 10 Target Coun-










                                                                                                             
 44 Id. 
 45 AKAMAI TECHS., STATE OF THE INTERNET / SECURITY Q1 2017 REPORT 16 
(Martin McKeay & Amanda Fakhreddine eds., 2016), https://www.aka-
mai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q1-2017-state-of-the-
internet-security-report.pdf. 
 46 Id. 
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Exhibit 2 







III. THE CYBERSECURITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Cybersecurity law and compliance with legal obligations is par-
ticularly difficult because there is no single source of authority—
such as a comprehensive federal statute or regulation—that exhaust-
ively lists legal obligations and duties. Instead, cybersecurity legal 
obligations are “set forth in an ever-expanding patchwork of state, 
federal, and international laws, regulations, and enforcement ac-
tions, as well as in common law duties, contractual commitments, 
and other expressed and implied obligations to provide ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘appropriate’ security.”48 In this section, we review a trio of cor-
porate data security legal obligations and then turn to address several 
other cybersecurity-related legal subjects. 
A. Corporate Duties of Loyalty and Care 
Because so much of U.S. critical infrastructure and cyber risk is 
in the hands of private corporations, effective governance of these 
entities is imperative. At the foundation of our system of corporate 
governance, corporate directors have two primary duties: (1) the 
                                                                                                             
 47 Id. 
 48 THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, INFORMATION SECURITY LAW: THE EMERGING 
STANDARD FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 29 (2008). 
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duty of loyalty (to place the corporate interest ahead of self-inter-
est);49 and (2) the duty of care.50 Subsets of the duty of care include 
                                                                                                             
 49 See Larry Catá Backer, Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: 
Race, Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 
1026–27 (2005); Bainbridge et al., supra note 12, at 564; Blair & Stout, supra 
note 12, at 1758–59; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independ-
ent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 58–60 
(2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Bound-
aries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 
1132 (2006); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Ex-
pectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936–40 
(2006); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 4–6; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 
17, at 717–19; Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding Author-
ized Access in the Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct Under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 285–87 (2013); Darian M. Ibrahim, 
Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 
955–57 (2008); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fidu-
ciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1084–86 (2017); Kenneth M. Rosen, Fiduciaries, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1046–48 (2007); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463 (2004); Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core De-
mand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 
635–36 (2010); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corpo-
rate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1239–40 (2010); Armour et al., supra note 
11, at 2. 
 50 See William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of 
the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL. 
ECON. 1, 10–11 (2008); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule - the 
Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 634–35 (2002); Gregory Scott 
Crespi, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law: The 
Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2004); Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 409–11 (2005); Lyman P. Q. 
Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1630 (2005); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Con-
trols After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Respon-
sibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 953 (2006); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana 
J. Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 594–95 
(2006); Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 337, 337–38 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Alten-
baumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337, 340 (2012). 
774 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:761 
 
the duties to monitor and to be informed. Recently, we have contrib-
uted to the corporate governance literature by expanding on the con-
cept of a corporate cybersecurity standard of care.51 
Elsewhere, we observe that “[t]he duty of care is a concept 
adapted from tort law, and it requires an actor to behave reasona-
bly.”52 Director liability for a breach of the duty of care may arise in 
two distinct contexts.53 First, liability may “follow from a board de-
cision that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or 
‘negligent.’”54 Second, liability may “arise from an unconsidered 
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention 
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”55 
B. Corporate Duty to Monitor 
At its core, a breach of the duty to monitor arises when “a loss 
eventuates not from a decision but, from unconsidered inaction.”56 
Observing that “[m]ost of the decisions that a corporation, acting 
through its human agents, makes are . . . not the subject of director 
attention,” the court in Caremark nonetheless recognized that “ordi-
nary business decisions that are made by officers and employees 
deeper in the interior of the organization can . . . vitally affect the 
welfare of the corporation and its ability to achieve its various stra-
tegic and financial goals.”57 
To satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed, corporate 
boards at a minimum must “assur[e] themselves that information 
                                                                                                             
 51 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and 
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1231, 1280 (2017) [hereinafter Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach]. 
 52 Id. at 1245 (citing Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care 
and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1159–60 (2013)). See 
also Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of 
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 303, 315–16 (2015). 
 53 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. (citing E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment 
Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project—A 
Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (1985)). 
 56 Id. at 968. 
 57 Id. 
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and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably 
designed to provide . . . timely, accurate information sufficient to 
allow management and the board . . . to reach informed judgments 
concerning . . . the corporation’s compliance with law.”58 This is not 
to say that there is a universal, one-size-fits-all solution to the duty 
to monitor—“the level of detail that is appropriate for such an infor-
mation system is a question of business judgment.”59 Nor does the 
mere existence of an adequate monitoring system eliminate the risk 
“that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that senior 
officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or oth-
erwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation’s 
compliance with the law.”60 
Accordingly, the duty to monitor requires “the board [to] exer-
cise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and 
reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the 
board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a 
timely manner.”61 Therefore, to avoid liability and to conform to 
relevant legal norms, directors should make a good faith attempt to 
ensure the company has a “corporate information gathering and re-
porting system” that the board finds satisfactory.62 In summary, the 
corporate law duty of care centers on whether corporate directors 
and officers employed a “good faith effort” to remain reasonably 
informed sufficient to exercise good judgment.63 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at 970. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. at 969. 
 63 Id. at 970; see also William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of 
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van 
Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
449, 457 n.31 (2002) (stating that “directors will not be held liable” for a breach 
of the duty to monitor without a finding of bad faith); Christopher M. Bruner, Is 
the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1046–47 (2013) (asserting that liability under the 
Caremark standard requires bad intentions toward the company, such as a “total 
board failure to engage in oversight”); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An 
Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (2002) (noting that in some states, 
directors are presumed to meet the duty of care if the decision was “informed,” 
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C. Corporate Duty to Disclose 
At least two distinct authorities require that a publicly traded 
corporation has a duty to disclose the existence of a data breach: (1) 
Delaware state corporate common law, and (2) the SEC’s 2011 cor-
porate finance disclosure guidance, which identifies material data 
security risks that companies must disclose under securities law dis-
closure requirements and accounting standards.64 Therefore, com-
panies that know about a data breach but fail to disclose it to share-
holders, regulators, and consumers, risk liability under potentially 
corporate, breach notification, and securities laws. 
Well established in Delaware common law is the concept that 
directors and officers of a corporation have a fiduciary duty to share-
holders and the corporation of disclosure—sometimes referred to as 
a duty of complete candor.65 Over two decades ago, Professor Law-
rence A. Hamermesh noted that Delaware courts have recognized 
“that a fiduciary duty to disclose all material information arises 
when directors approve any public statement, such as a press release, 
regardless of whether any specific stockholder action is sought.”66 
Director negligence is irrelevant in assessing the duty to disclose.67 
The duty serves two purposes: (1) “to afford stockholders a rem-
edy,” regardless of whether they relied upon a misstatement or omis-
sion, and (2) “to afford a ‘virtual per se rule’ of damages,” awarding 
stockholders a monetary award “without having to establish actual 
loss.”68 In sum, the duty to disclose in Delaware requires that direc-
tors provide shareholders with “all material information” about the 
                                                                                                             
and “unless the directors had been . . . grossly negligent in failing to inform them-
selves, before acting,” courts deem the decision to be informed). 
 64 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE 
GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2: CYBERSECURITY (2011), https://www.sec.gov/divi-
sions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [hereinafter SEC CF DISCLOSURE 
GUIDANCE]; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corpo-
rate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1089–90 
(1996). 
 65 Hamermesh, supra note 64, at 1097 & nn.34–35. 
 66 Id. at 1091. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. 
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corporation whenever they communicate with the shareholder or 
market, even if the shareholder did not request it.69 
Guidance provided during 2011 by the SEC’s division of corpo-
ration finance notes that “federal securities laws, in part, are de-
signed to elicit disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate 
information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would 
consider important to an investment decision.”70 Although the Guid-
ance acknowledges that “no existing disclosure requirement explic-
itly refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents,” the SEC none-
theless required the disclosure of “material information regarding 
cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents” to prevent misleading the 
public.71 The Guidance provides several examples of situations in 
which corporate disclosure is mandatory. First, the Guidance pro-
vides that it “expect[s] registrants to evaluate their cybersecurity 
risks and take into account all available relevant information, includ-
ing prior cyber incidents and the severity and frequency of those 
incidents.”72 Second, the Guidance advises that: 
[r]egistrants should address cybersecurity risks and 
cyber incidents . . . if the costs or other consequences 
associated with one or more known incidents or the 
risk of potential incidents represent a material event, 
trend, or uncertainty that is reasonably likely to have 
a material effect on the registrant’s results of opera-
tions, liquidity, or financial condition.73 
The Industrial Internet provides management with an enhanced 
capability to mitigate enterprise risk. As Greengard observes, given 
“the right software and dashboard in place, it’s possible to view data 
across an entire physical infrastructure. In other words, an agency or 
organization could clearly determine—based on structural data      
                                                                                                             
 69 Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate Of-
ficers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 233 (2009); see also 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert 
Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205, 
228 (2013) [hereinafter Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Finan-
cial Expert?]. 
 70 SEC CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 64. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. 
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rather than opinions and politics—the real world risks and costs of 
fixing or ignoring a problem.”74 
D. Challenge to Corporate Governance 
Recent years have shown, as well as in these pages to follow, 
that “[f]ew enterprise operational areas present as much inherent 
risk or prove as difficult to govern as Information Technology” 
(IT).75 Not many corporate directors have an engineering, data, or 
information technologies background that prepares the director to 
bring an expert viewpoint based upon knowledge and experience 
about cybersecurity issues to boardroom risk discussions. In recog-
nition of this critically important board responsibility for risk man-
agement, “new SEC rules went into effect on February 28, 2010 
amending Item 407 of Regulation S-K to require disclosure about 
the board’s role in a company’s risk oversight process and its lead-
ership structure.”76 The SEC states that the new disclosure rules re-
quire “companies . . . to describe how the board administers its risk 
                                                                                                             
 74 See SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS 66 (2015). 
 75 See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Di-
rector Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 112 (2012) [here-
inafter Trautman, The Matrix]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corpo-
rate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44, 94–95 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, 
Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 263–64 (2016) [hereinafter Trautman, Lessons from Pay-
pal]; Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 
13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 324 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony (Tony) 
J. Luppino & Malika Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to 
Know About the Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 155, 172 (2016); Trautman, 
Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert?, supra note 69, at 232. 
 76 See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 75, at 113 & n.84 (quoting Trautman 
& Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 11, at 317 & n.15) (“The text of the new rule 
reads: (h) Board leadership structure and role in risk oversight. Briefly describe 
the leadership structure of the registrant’s board, such as whether the same person 
serves as both principal executive officer and chairman of the board, or whether 
two individuals serve in those positions, and, in the case of a registrant that is an 
investment company, whether the chairman of the board is an ‘interested person’ 
of the registrant as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act 
(15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19)). If one person serves as both principal executive officer 
and chairman of the board, or if the chairman of the board of a registrant that is 
an investment company is an ‘interested person’ of the registrant, disclose 
whether the registrant has a lead independent director and what specific role the 
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oversight function, such as through the whole board, or through a 
separate risk committee or the audit committee, for example.”77 Dis-
closures should address, for example, “whether the individuals who 
supervise the day-to-day risk management responsibilities report di-
rectly to the board as a whole or to a board committee or how the 
board or committee otherwise receives information from such indi-
viduals.”78 Such disclosures should also include an explanation of 
the board’s leadership structure and the “reasons why” the company 
believes that this board leadership structure is the most “appropriate 
structure for the company.”79 In companies in which the CEO and 
Chairman are the same individual, rule “amendments will require 
disclosure of whether and why the company has a lead independent 
director, as well as the specific role the lead independent director 
plays in the leadership of the company.”80 
E. Other Relevant Legal Authorities 
As discussed briefly above, data privacy legal obligations are the 
byproduct of an exceptionally complex web of statutes, rules, and 
regulations of a dizzying array of sources. A non-comprehensive list 
of these sources follows below. 
1. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
These include: “privacy laws, data security laws, electronic 
transaction laws, corporate governance laws, unfair and deceptive 
business practice and consumer protection laws, and breach notifi-
cation laws.”81 
                                                                                                             
lead independent director plays in the leadership of the board. This disclosure 
should indicate why the registrant has determined that its leadership structure is 
appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the registrant. In 
addition, disclose the extent of the board’s role in the risk oversight of the regis-
trant, such as how the board administers its oversight function, and the effect that 
this has on the board’s leadership structure.”). 
 77 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NOS. 33-9089, 34-61175, IC-29092, 
PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS (Feb. 28, 2010), http://sec.gov/rules/fi-
nal/2009/33-9089.pdf. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.; see also Trautman & Michaely, supra note 17, at 278. 
 81 Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach, supra note 51, at 1235. 
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On the federal level, privacy statutes include: Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, which concerns the financial sector;82 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
which concerns healthcare information;83 the Privacy Act of 1974, 
which establishes governmental record-keeping requirements;84 and 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which applies to all 
businesses that collect personal information on the Internet from 
children.85 
Some federal regulations also require organizations to protect 
specific types of data; these include IRS revenue procedures requir-
ing security measures to protect electronic tax records86 and SEC 
regulations requiring the protection of corporate financial data.87 
Federal banking regulations also impose an obligation on financial 
institutions to disclose security breaches.88 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has been particularly active 
enforcing data security obligations. Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act),89 associated Federal Trade Commis-
sion enforcement actions, and equivalent state statutes are the chief 
                                                                                                             
 82 See Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see 
generally Timothy J. Yeager et al., The Financial Services Modernization Act: 
Evolution or Revolution?, 59 J. ECON. & BUS. 313 (2007). 
 83 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 84 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (2012). 
 85 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–02 
(2012). 
 86 See Rev. Proc. 97-22, 1997-1 C.B. 652; Rev. Proc. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 689. 
 87 See 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 257.1(e)(3) (2011). 
 88 See Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 30, Interagency Guidance on Re-
sponse Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Cus-
tomer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2017); see Supplement A to Appendix D-2 to Part 
208-Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Consumer Information and Consumer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 (2017); see Sup-
plement A to Appendix B to Part 364-Interagency Guidance on Response Pro-
grams for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 
12 C.F.R. pt. 364 (2017) (reviewing commentator feedback on agency proposed 
guidance for how institutions should respond and notify consumers following un-
authorized access to consumer information). 
 89 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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sources for the imposition of consumer protection data security ob-
ligations. From 2005 through the present, the FTC has aggressively 
pursued a broad interpretation of the law in its cybersecurity-related 
enforcement actions by contending that a company’s failure to pro-
vide appropriate data security for consumers’ personal information 
was, alone, an unfair (not deceptive) trade practice.90 That is, a com-
pany could be liable without ever having misrepresented the extent 
of its data security practices to consumers.91 Subsequently, in Au-
gust 2015, the Third Circuit ratified the FTC’s broader theory of li-
ability.92 
On the state level, several states have enacted data security stat-
utes that impose a general obligation on all companies to ensure the 
security of personal information.93 Moreover, forty-seven states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have 
also enacted cybersecurity breach notification laws, which impose 
an obligation to disclose security breaches to those affected.94 
                                                                                                             
 90 See Discussion Draft of H.R.__, A Bill to Require Greater Protection for 
Sensitive Consumer Data and Timely Notification in Case of Breach, 112th Cong. 
44 (2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, FTC) (“[T]he Commission en-
forces the FTC Act’s proscription against unfair . . . acts . . . in cases where a 
business[‘s] . . . failure to employ reasonable security measures causes or is likely 
to cause substantial consumer injury.”); see The Threat of Data Theft to American 
Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of David C. 
Vladeck, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC) (same). 
 91 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, supra note 85. 
 92 See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245–47, 249, 259 
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Wyndham’s failure to secure consumer information, 
which resulted in actual harm to consumers, fell within the plain meaning of “un-
fair”). 
 93 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016); see also SMEDINGHOFF, 
supra note 48, at 5. 
 94 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technol-
ogy/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 6, 2018). 
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2. COMMON LAW 
While commentators have long contended there is, at the very 
least, a “common law duty to provide adequate security for corpo-
rate data,”95 courts have only more recently explicitly agreed. In 
2005, for instance, a state appellate court in Bell v. Michigan Coun-
cil 2596 held that the “defendant did owe plaintiffs a duty to protect 
them from identity theft by providing some safeguards to ensure the 
security of their most essential confidential identifying infor-
mation.”97 
And, more recently, a federal district court held: 
Although neither party provided the Court with case 
law to support or reject the existence of a legal duty 
to safeguard a consumer’s confidential information 
entrusted to a commercial entity, the Court finds the 
legal duty well supported by both common sense and 
California and Massachusetts law. As a result, be-
cause Plaintiffs allege that they provided their Per-
sonal Information to Sony as part of a commercial 
transaction, and that Sony failed to employ reasona-
ble security measures to protect their Personal Infor-
mation, including the utilization of industry-standard 
encryption, the Court finds Plaintiffs have suffi-
ciently alleged a legal duty and a corresponding 
breach.98 
                                                                                                             
 95 SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 48, at 31 (citing Kimberly Kiefer & Randy V. 
Sabett, Openness of Internet Creates Potential for Corporate Information Secu-
rity Liability, 1 BNA PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 788 (2002); Alan Charles Raul 
et al., Liability for Computer Glitches and Online Security Lapses, 6 BNA ELEC. 
COMMERCE L. REP. 849 (2001); Erin Kenneally, The Byte Stops Here: Duty and 
Liability for Negligent Internet Security, 16 COMPUTER SECURITY J. 1 (2000)). 
 96 No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per cu-
riam). 
 97 Id. at *5. 
 98 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted); see generally Lawrence J. 
Trautman, The SONY Data Hack: Implications for World Order (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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3. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
When third parties have possession of, control over, or access to 
corporate data, companies that entrust third parties to manage their 
data are increasingly trying to satisfy their duty to protect the secu-
rity of their data by contract.99 
4. SELF-IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS 
Finally, companies have also imposed requirements on them-
selves. In addition to the FTC’s unfair theory of cybersecurity lia-
bility, the agency also aggressively enforces representations that or-
ganizations make about their own security practices under a decep-
tive trade practice theory.100 
5. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A comprehensive review of the multitude of U.S. Constitutional 
issues implicated by the fast-developing digital threats reviewed be-
low is beyond the scope of this paper and will likely be the topic of 
a future body of scholarly work from us. Given the space limitations 
provided to a single law journal article, we can do little more here 
than provide a modest list of a few of the major issues implicated. 
These topics include: First Amendment;101 Third Amendment;102 
                                                                                                             
 99 SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 48, at 33. 
 100 See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J. 
2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that in light of Wyndham’s 
publication of a privacy policy, in which it promised to protect consumers’ per-
sonal information, the failure to implement corresponding security measures 
amounted to an unfair practice under the FTC Act). 
 101 See Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amend-
ment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007). 
 102 See Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third 
Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203, 
1206–07, 1227 (2013). 
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Fourth Amendment;103 Broadcast regulation;104 copyright law is-
sues;105 legality of war;106 and privacy.107 
F. The Cybersecurity Standard of Care 
Evolving concepts of cyber specific law remain challenged by 
the rapid pace of developing technologies.108 Elsewhere, we have 
presented a detailed discussion outlining the concept of Corporate 
Directors’ and Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care, in part as 
a response to the recent Yahoo Data Breaches.109 
As noted above and throughout this section, there is no one, sin-
gle, comprehensive cybersecurity statute or regulation. This patch-
work of authorities has given rise to a one-size-fits-all process-ori-
                                                                                                             
 103 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 825–26 (2016); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications 
of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 626–27 (2011); see also Ormerod 
& Trautman, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15). 
 104 See Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Consti-
tutional Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485, 486 
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013). 
 105 See Lidiya Mishchenko, The Internet of Things: Where Privacy and Cop-
yright Collide, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 90, 100 (2016). 
 106 See Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said than Done: Legal 
Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 115, 118–20 (2014); 
Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar? International Law, Domestic 
Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR 
VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 191–93 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); Carol M. 
Hayes & Jay P. Kesan, Law of Cyber Warfare 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Research Paper Series No. 14-26, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396078. 
 107 See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: 
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2015). 
 108 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Fu-
ture of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 232–33 (2016); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment 
Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2017); Trautman, Les-
sons from Paypal, supra note 75, 282–83; Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Curren-
cies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives 
Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance 
Risks 5–6 (2018) (unpublished manuscript). 
 109 See Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach, supra note 51, at 1234–35. 
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ented approach to organizational data security: the Written Infor-
mation Security Program (WISP).110 This “emerging digital security 
standard is particularized and case specific,” and that,  “[u]nlike 
prior specific requirements, such as passwords or firewalls, the new 
corporate security obligation is fact-specific, requiring companies to 
go through a ‘process’ and determine what security measures are 
most appropriate for the company’s security needs.”111 Under the 
WISP protocol, organizations create their own specific security 
measures and are required to “conduct ongoing reviews of their se-
curity mechanisms.”112 “This repetitive review process includes de-
tecting and evaluating risks, implementing specific security re-
sponses to those risks, verifying the effective implementation of 
those security responses, and updating the measures as needed in 
reaction to developing security concerns.”113 
The seven steps of a comprehensive WISP protocol are: 
Assign Responsibility: A corporation should ex-
pressly designate one or more employees to be re-
sponsible for maintaining the data security program. 
Identify Information Assets: A corporation should 
identify its information assets that require protection, 
which include both the data itself (i.e., records con-
taining personal information) and the computing sys-
tems that store the personal information (e.g., serv-
ers, laptops, and portable devices). 
Conduct Risk Assessment: A corporation should per-
form a risk assessment to identify both internal and 
external risks to its data security, and it should eval-
uate the effectiveness of the company’s current prac-
tices for safeguarding and minimizing the risks iden-
tified. 
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Select and Implement Responsive Security Controls: 
A corporation should implement physical, adminis-
trative, and technical security controls it considers 
appropriate to minimize the risks it identified in its 
risk assessment. 
Monitor Effectiveness: A corporation should regu-
larly monitor, test, and reassess the security controls 
it has chosen to implement in order to ensure its se-
curity program is operating in a manner reasonably 
calculated to protect personal information. Relatedly, 
a corporation should regularly upgrade its security 
controls as necessary to limit emerging risks. 
Regularly Review the Security Program: A corpora-
tion should review and adjust its data security pro-
gram no less than once per year. A corporation 
should also perform security program reviews when-
ever there is a material change in business practices 
that could affect personal information or after any in-
cident involving a breach of its data security. 
Address Third Party Issues: A corporation should 
take all reasonable steps to verify that every third-
party service provider that has access to the com-
pany’s data assets and personal information has the 
capacity to protect that information.114 
More and more authorities are endorsing the process-oriented 
approach of WISP for complex organizations facing myriad and di-
verse digital security difficulties. Of particular note is the recent 
adoption of the WISP protocol by a Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, an approached favored by the U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion.115 
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IV. STUXNET 
Cyber threats are already challenging public trust and confidence 
in global institutions, governance, and norms, while imposing costs 
on the US and global economies. Cyber threats also pose an in-
creasing risk to public health, safety, and prosperity as cyber tech-
nologies are integrated with critical infrastructure in key sectors. 
These threats are amplified by our ongoing delegation of deci-
sionmaking, sensing, and authentication roles to potentially vulner-
able automated systems. This delegation increases the likely physi-
cal, economic, and psychological consequences of cyber attack and 
exploitation events when they do occur. 
 
Daniel R. Coats 
   Director of National Intelligence 
   May 11, 2017116 
 
Digital threats to objects—and people—in the physical world 
increased by leaps and bounds in July 2010, when the world’s fore-
most digital security experts discovered a computer virus radically 
different and far more sophisticated than any seen previously.117 The 
mysteries of the virus’s author and purpose unraveled throughout 
the end of 2010, and by early 2011 a single hypothesis had garnered 
widespread acceptance, which was confirmed in June 2012:118 this 
piece of malware, dubbed “Stuxnet” (or code name Olympic 
Games)119 was a covert joint operation between the United States 
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and Israel to sabotage Iranian centrifuges—industrial machines in-
tegral to the purification of radioactive uranium.120 By modulating 
the speed that Iranian centrifuges spun, Stuxnet covertly devastated 
the machines from within—representing the first time the world 
“had seen digital code in the wild being used to physically destroy 
something in the real world.”121 
The ramifications of the Stuxnet virus are profound. Some have 
called Stuxnet “the first unattributable act of war.”122 Stuxnet repre-
sents a paradigm shift in how warfare could increasingly be waged 
in the 21st century.123 Unlike traditional military clashes, these con-
flicts will take place in secret, over the Internet.124 For the people 
whose lives depend on the targets of the cyber weapons, “the results 
could be as catastrophic as a bombing raid, but would be even more 
disorienting.”125 
Yet aside from these military implications, Stuxnet represents an 
entirely new type of weapon—a digital warhead capable of devas-
tating tangible structures, systems, and the people that depend on 
them, far from a theater of battle.126 Because Stuxnet exploited a tiny 
computer that is ubiquitous in modern industrial machinery, a virus 
similar to Stuxnet could have immensely harmful effects on indus-
trialized nations’ critical infrastructure.127 The tiny computers Stux-
net commandeered were PLCs.128 PLCs perform tasks as varied as 
opening and shutting valves in water pipes, timing the change of 
traffic lights, and dolloping out the appropriate amount of cream into 
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individual Oreo cookies.129 Stuxnet’s hijacking of the PLCs in Ira-
nian centrifuges is a dire warning: the very basis of modern indus-
trial life is an exploitable target for a cyber attack. 
Stuxnet and its progeny have revealed the susceptibility of criti-
cal civilian infrastructure to digital attack. Details of the Stuxnet vi-
rus illuminate why the virus represents a dramatic shift in cyber-
warfare. Understanding the novel threat that Stuxnet presents, criti-
cal infrastructure has nonetheless failed to address and fix the vul-
nerabilities that Stuxnet exploited. Further, the existing cyber-secu-
rity legal framework in the United States may prove inadequate to 
address the challenges that Stuxnet presents. 
A. The Stuxnet Virus 
On June 17, 2010, Sergey Ulasen, the head of an anti-virus divi-
sion of a small information technology security company based in 
Belarus, read an e-mail report explaining that a virus had infected a 
client’s computer in Iran, and the virus caused the client’s computer 
to continually reboot.130 After obtaining a copy of the virus and shar-
ing it among some colleagues, the men discovered that the virus was 
infecting Microsoft’s Windows operating system, “using a vulnera-
bility that had never been detected before.”131 Such a discovery is a 
substantial event; a vulnerability that the program’s creator is una-
ware of and that has never before been detected is referred to as a 
“zero day.”132 Of the more than twelve million pieces of malware 
that antivirus researchers discover annually, fewer than a dozen uti-
lize a zero-day vulnerability.133 Windows’ zero days can fetch as 
much as $100,000 on the black market likely because of their ability 
to be employed for a number of nefarious purposes.134 
But the virus Ulasen and his colleagues was studying was re-
markable in a number of other respects as well. For one, the virus 
spread in a way that had previously never been seen. By inserting a 
flash drive into a computer, the virus covertly uploaded two files—
one, a piece of code that granted the virus complete control over the 
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computer, and second, a payload of heavily encrypted malicious 
code.135 
Alarmingly, once the two components uploaded themselves 
from the flash drive, they hid themselves within the host com-
puter.136 Doing so is no simple task—the virus employed “a digital 
signature” to fool the host computer into believing the virus was a 
legitimate piece of software.137 Digital signatures are analogous to 
passports; they serve as a proof of identity and legitimacy for soft-
ware crossing from one computer to another.138 In the past, malware 
writers have used fake, forged digital signatures to trick the target 
computer, but software security consultants have long suspected that 
sooner or later malware writers would jump to using genuine, stolen 
digital signatures instead.139 The virus Ulasen and his colleagues had 
discovered was the first documented instance of a genuine, stolen 
digital signature.140 Moreover, the digital signature had been stolen 
from one of the most trusted names in cyber-security—Realtek.141 
Thus, “the new virus Ulasen was looking at might as well have been 
carrying a cop’s badge.”142 
Given the alarming sophistication of this virus, on July 5 Ulasen 
began alerting a number of authorities: first was Microsoft, to notify 
the company of the zero day vulnerability that the virus exploited; 
second was Realtek, to make the company aware of the stolen digital 
signature; finally, on July 12 Ulasen posted a report about the virus 
on a cyber-security message board.143  Once alerted, internet author-
ities revoked the digital signature the virus was using.144 But shock-
ingly, on July 14 a new version of the virus appeared that used an-
other genuine, stolen digital signature—this one from a different 
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company.145 This evidence strongly suggested that someone was ac-
tively helping the virus continue to avoid detection.146 
Three days after Ulasen posted about the virus, a cyber-security 
blogger published a story about the virus—at this point dubbed 
“Stuxnet” by Microsoft using a combination of file names found in 
the malicious code.147 As the news of Stuxnet spread, “antivirus 
companies around the world scrambled” to obtain copies of the mal-
ware for their own research purposes.148 As the computer security 
industry worked to decrypt and deconstruct Stuxnet, more troubling 
information came to light. For one, it appeared that the virus first 
appeared around a year earlier—in June 2009—and its creator had 
updated and refined the virus numerous times, releasing at least 
three different versions before Ulasen’s discovery in June 2010.149 
Second, the geographical location of infected computers was 
anomalous. In the past, South Korea and the United States were 
overwhelmingly the epicenters of malware infections, given those 
countries’ outsized number of Internet connections.150 Of the 38,000 
initial Stuxnet infections, approximately 22,000 were in Iran.151 In-
donesia placed a distant second with approximately 6,700 infec-
tions, and India with 3,700; the United States had fewer than 400 
infections.152 Third, researchers discovered that Stuxnet did not ex-
ploit a single zero day vulnerability in Windows, but instead four 
zero day vulnerabilities.153 This “was unprecedented—one of the 
great technical blockbusters in malware history.”154 
The fourth anomaly was the virus’s apparent target. Cyber-secu-
rity experts deduced that “the virus was designed to target . . . an 
industrial control system made by the German conglomerate Sie-
mens that was used to program controllers that drive motors, valves 
                                                                                                             
 145 See Gross, supra note 4. 
 146 See id. 
 147 See Zetter, supra note 121. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See Gross, supra note 4. 
 154 Id. 
792 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:761 
 
and switches in everything from food factories and automobile as-
sembly lines to gas pipelines and water treatment plants.”155 Tradi-
tionally, computer viruses have been employed for financial gain, 
such as stealing credit card data, online banking information, and 
trade secrets.156 Stuxnet’s targeting of these industrial control sys-
tems—known as “programmable logic controllers,” or PLCs—was 
odd because there was no obvious information to exploit for finan-
cial gain.157 Stuxnet appeared to simply be stealing data from Sie-
mens PLCs, and most experts were prepared to write Stuxnet off as 
an unusually sophisticated case of corporate espionage.158 
Researchers from Symantec, one the world’s largest engineers 
of computer security software, were dissatisfied with attributing 
such an advanced piece of malware to mere espionage and under-
took a massive effort to discover Stuxnet’s true purpose.159 
Throughout July 2010, a team of analysts and experts positioned 
across the globe160 made the aforementioned discovery that Stux-
net’s malicious payload would only spring into action once it de-
tected that a host computer was running a piece of software that con-
trols a Siemens PLC.161 
Further, the Symantec engineers discovered that when Stuxnet 
found a host computer attached to a Siemens PLC, it would intercept 
the information exchanged between the host computer and the 
PLC.162 Stuxnet would commandeer the PLC by injecting its own 
malicious code into the PLC, while simultaneously disabling any 
automated alarms the PLC would report back to the host computer; 
in effect, Stuxnet hid the rouge commands the virus was sending to 
the PLC from the host computer.163 Thus, someone monitoring the 
PLC from the host computer would operate under the assumption 
that the PLC was functioning normally while in reality Stuxnet was 
serendipitously controlling the PLC.164 In sum, Stuxnet worked 
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“like a Hollywood heist film where jewelry thieves insert a looped 
video clip into a surveillance camera feed so that guards watching 
monitors see only a benign image instead of a live feed of the thieves 
in action.”165 
On August 6, 2010, Symantec published a blog post that laid out 
the company’s findings regarding Stuxnet’s true purpose.166 But lit-
tle immediate reaction followed because of a simple problem—most 
cyber-security experts knew very little about PLCs and what effect 
Stuxnet could have on them.167 
Meanwhile in Germany, a man named Ralph Langner, who 
knew very little about cyber-security but quite a bit about PLCs, 
took up the case after reading Symantec’s post.168 “Langner knew 
that thousands of Siemens customers had a potentially silent killer 
on their system, and they were waiting for Symantec or Siemens to 
tell them what Stuxnet was doing to their industrial controllers.”169 
Yet no word from Siemens or Symantec came, and thus Langner—
with his primitive and self-taught knowledge of computers—delved 
into the virus’s code himself.170 
After three weeks of work, Langner and his small team came to 
a startling conclusion—Stuxnet was not aimed at all Siemens PLCs, 
as the corporate espionage theory would suggest; instead, the virus 
searched for a specific technical configuration—a single facility—
and sought to infiltrate only it.171 To Langner, the various clues 
pointed to a single conclusion: a well-funded organization, most 
likely a government with precise knowledge of its target, had written 
Stuxnet.172 Langner explained his deduction as follows: “[t]o see 
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that somebody built such [sic] sophisticated piece of malware—us-
ing four zero-day vulnerabilities, using two stolen certificates—to 
attack one single installation? That’s unbelievable.”173 
While Stuxnet’s exact target had not been identified, Langner 
had a hunch as to where the virus was aimed.174 At one point, 
Langner announced to two colleagues, “[t]his is about taking out 
Bushehr,” referring to an Iranian nuclear power plant that had been 
scheduled to go operational in August 2010 but had been delayed 
with little explanation.175 Langner’s colleagues were leery of his the-
ory of state-sponsored cyber-terrorism that likely implicated the 
United States and Israel, but Langner remained undeterred.176 
Eventually, Langner simply put his theory into the public; he 
posted on his blog his belief “that Stuxnet was the first literal cyber-
weapon,” and it was aimed at the Iranian nuclear program at Bu-
shehr.177 On September 21, 2010, The Christian Science Monitor 
reported a story on Langner’s theory;178 the next day, another Ger-
man computer expert went on the record to assert that Stuxnet’s tar-
get was not Bushehr, but was instead Iran’s Natanz uranium-enrich-
ment facility.179 On January 15, 2011, The New York Times acceler-
ated the story, suggesting that Stuxnet was a covert United States 
intelligence project that began under President George W. Bush and 
hastened under President Barack Obama.180 
As the rumors swirled online in response to Langner’s theory, 
the engineers at Symantec continued to dismantle the virus’s code, 
struggling to provide concrete evidence to corroborate one of the 
various theories.181 The break came in November—Symantec had 
posted a request on its blog for anyone with expertise in critical in-
frastructure to contact Symantec, and a Dutch programmer wrote 
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back.182 The Dutch programmer provided a critical piece of infor-
mation that led Symantec to the ultimate resolution of Stuxnet’s pur-
pose.183 
Using the Dutch programmer’s tip, the Symantec engineers dis-
covered that Stuxnet’s target was not all PLCs but only a specific 
type of PLCs, called frequency converters.184 “Frequency converters 
modulate the speed of motors and rotors in things like high-speed 
drills,” so if you increase the frequency of the drive, then the rotor 
increases its spin.185 Additional research into what type of machin-
ery spun at the frequencies that Stuxnet modulated revealed a star-
tling answer—the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates 
for export from the United States machines that spun at the frequen-
cies Stuxnet targeted.186 One Symantec engineer recalled the mo-
ment of enlightenment: “We realized, wait a second, these things, at 
this frequency, could be used for uranium enrichment.”187 
Thus, the engineers were able to corroborate Langner’s theory 
and reveal what Stuxnet was doing when it injected its own mali-
cious code into the PLCs: increasing the frequency that centrifuges 
spin.188 In short, Stuxnet “was designed to send Iran’s nuclear cen-
trifuges spinning wildly out of control.”189 Symantec’s discovery ce-
mented the conclusion that Stuxnet was not intended for espionage 
but for causing physical damage.190 Stuxnet “was the first time any-
one had seen digital code in the wild being used to physically de-
stroy something in the real world.”191 As Langner puts it, “Code 
analysis makes it clear that Stuxnet is not about sending a message 
or proving a concept . . . . It is about destroying its targets with ut-
most determination in military style.”192 
Once the purpose of Stuxnet was discovered, the obvious next 
question was of attribution. In January 2011, The New York Times 
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published a lengthy story that alleged Israel’s Dimona complex in 
the Negev desert—the heavily fortified center of Israel’s never-
acknowledged nuclear weapon program—doubled as a critical test-
ing ground for Stuxnet.193 The article further alleged that Stuxnet 
represented a “joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s 
efforts to make a [nuclear] bomb of its own.”194 Within the 
Dimona’s complex, the quoted experts asserted, Israel had spun the 
exact same type of nuclear centrifuges found at Natanz in an effort 
to test and refine the Stuxnet virus.195 One American nuclear intel-
ligence expert asserted, “To check out the worm, you have to know 
the machines . . . . The reason the worm has been effective is that 
the Israelis tried it out.”196 
One of the most difficult remaining questions surrounding Stux-
net was its degree of success. Given the opaqueness of the Iranian 
government, experts have differed on whether or not Stuxnet accom-
plished its ends.197 A preliminary assessment paper for the Institute 
for Science and International Security asserted that Stuxnet’s effec-
tiveness is difficult to ascertain, given the uncertainty regarding both 
the virus’s exact purpose and overall effect.198 Given these limita-
tions, the authors still asserted that if Stuxnet’s aim was to destroy 
all of the centrifuges at Natanz, then Stuxnet failed; but if Stuxnet’s 
goal was to destroy a limited number of centrifuges, thereby setting 
back the Iranian nuclear program while making detection of the vi-
rus difficult, then Stuxnet “may have succeeded, at least for a little 
while.”199 In sum, the data suggest that between late 2009 and early 
2010, Iran faced significant difficulties with centrifuges at Natanz, 
decommissioning and replacing approximately 1,000 machines.200 
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The authors were careful to note that this level of replacement “ex-
ceeded expectations and occurred during an extended period of rel-
atively poor centrifuge performance.”201 
B. Implications for Critical Infrastructure 
While Stuxnet is fascinating in a myriad of respects—geopoliti-
cal and technological, to name a few—the virus also serves as a stark 
warning. Even in the wake of the Stuxnet virus, the critical infra-
structure industry has shown little appetite for implementing 
measures that would remedy glaring vulnerabilities in its defenses. 
Organizations that own and operate critical infrastructure should 
adopt a WISP protocol in order to identify and mitigate the threats 
confronting them. 
The problem that Stuxnet poses is that its target—PLCs—is 
ubiquitous in modern life.202 The PLC is one of the most important 
modern manufacturing innovations.203 By permitting manufacturers 
to automate industrial processes in real time, coupled with the ability 
to withstand extreme temperatures, electrical noise, and vibration, 
the PLC “changed the way we automate our factories and is still 
widely in use today.”204 
But before Stuxnet, few had reason to believe that PLCs were 
exploitable. Stuxnet represented “the first time anyone had seen dig-
ital code . . . being used to physically destroy something in the real 
world.”205 In testimony before the United States House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce in July 2011, offi-
cials from the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) attested to Stuxnet representing a game changer:206 “DHS 
analysis concluded that this highly complex computer worm was the 
first of its kind, written to specifically target mission-critical control 
                                                                                                             
 201 Id. 
 202 Alison Dunn, The Father of Invention: Dick Morley Looks Back on the 
40th Anniversary of the PLC, MANUFACTURING AUTOMATION (Sept. 12, 2008), 
http://www.automationmag.com/features/the-father-of-invention-dick-morley-
looks-back-on-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-plc.html. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Zetter, supra note 121. 
 206 See Cybersecurity: An Overview of Risks to Critical Infrastructure: Hear-
ing Before Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy 
& Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011). 
798 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:761 
 
systems running a specific combination of software and hard-
ware.”207 In the next breath, DHS officials warned that clones of 
Stuxnet could attack the country’s power generation plants, water 
treatment facilities, and other critical infrastructure.208 The officials 
asserted that the purpose of such an attack on critical infrastructure 
“would be to shut down or impair the infrastructure on which normal 
civilian life depends, diverting scarce resources, hurting civilian 
support for the war effort, and complicating military mobilization 
that depends on the civilian infrastructure.”209 
Yet the threat that Stuxnet clones pose for industrialized nations’ 
critical infrastructure cuts two ways. On one hand, Stuxnet repre-
sents an opportunity for terrorists, hackers, criminals, or nation-
states to infiltrate and damage another country’s electrical, financial, 
gas, oil, water, and sewage systems. But on the other hand, Stuxnet’s 
level of sophistication has left many industry leaders shrugging their 
shoulders, doubting that their systems are likely targets. 
McAfee, another computer security giant, recently conducted a 
global survey of critical infrastructure companies to ascertain their 
level of cybersecurity and preparation against cyberattacks.210 
“Two-fifths of all respondents, and nearly half of those in the elec-
tric industry, said that they had found Stuxnet on their systems.”211 
McAfee acknowledged that while Stuxnet was likely aimed at a sin-
gle facility and was harmless to other sites, the widespread infection 
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represents an utter failure of industry’s cybersecurity measures.212 
Yet, “the discovery of Stuxnet on their systems did not seem to gal-
vanize companies to action.”213 At least one expert attributes indus-
try’s inaction to governmental apathy, stating that “without clear 
government policy on the issue, individual ministries and companies 
are left to implement their own measures.”214 
Even more troubling, industry continues to willfully ignore the 
threat that a Stuxnet-like attack poses. Industry executives told 
McAfee with near unanimity that they remained more concerned 
about denial-of–service (DoS) attacks than about malware like Stux-
net.215 A third of respondents to McAfee’s global survey “declared 
that they were not at all confident or not very confident” in their 
ability to combat a DoS attack, but when prompted regarding mal-
ware designed for sabotage, “respondents expressed a similar lack 
of confidence only about 20 percent of the time.”216 A United States-
based cybersecurity expert confirmed, “After Stuxnet, many people 
said, ‘I don’t have Siemens, I’m not nuclear—I could [sic] care 
less.’”217 As McAfee noted in its published report, getting the criti-
cal infrastructure industry to perceive Stuxnet as a potential problem 
is a massive impediment to progress.218 
Indeed, we have previously seen a very similar example of in-
dustry’s inaction to the threat of a malware infiltration: the original 
wave of attacks on Microsoft’s Windows in the 1990s. Microsoft 
was initially caught flat-footed when researchers and hackers first 
began exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows.219 “It was only after 
several years of antagonism between [Microsoft headquarters] and 
the hackers ripping apart its software that Microsoft figured out how 
to work with hackers.”220 In the 1990s, researchers became so weary 
with Microsoft’s inaction whenever the researchers would find a 
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vulnerability, they simply began publishing technical details, thus 
forcing Microsoft to release a fix before the vulnerability could be 
exploited for nefarious ends.221 
But continued antagonism between hackers and critical infra-
structure is not tenable. Having this pattern repeat in the context of 
critical infrastructure is far more troublesome because “a security 
flaw could lead to a chemical spill or a widespread power blackout, 
and . . . it can take months to schedule and install [software 
fixes].”222 One information-security expert with Boeing asserted 
that the infrastructure industry is “basically just 10 years behind the 
curve on security. It’s like we’re going back to the ‘90s.”223 
Finally, variations of the Stuxnet worm have been appearing 
nearly since it was first discovered. In October 2011, a new virus, 
dubbed “Duqu,” which utilized large portions of Stuxnet’s original 
source code, surfaced online.224 According to Symantec, who ini-
tially posted a bulletin warning of the virus, Duqu’s purpose is en-
tirely different than Stuxnet.225 Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelli-
gence data and assets from entities such as industrial control system 
manufacturers in order to more easily conduct a future attack against 
another third party.226 The attackers are looking for information such 
as design documents that could help them mount a future attack on 
an industrial control facility.227 
Similarly, in May 2012, a consortium of researchers unveiled 
their findings about a piece of malware related to Stuxnet, which 
they dubbed Flame.228 Much like Stuxnet and Duqu, Flame is a com-
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plex virus with a number of modular components that strongly sug-
gest its use in a sophisticated, targeted attack.229 Media reports later 
confirmed the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) de-
veloped all three strains of malware as part of the same Olympics 
Game operation.230 
With Stuxnet’s source code still widely available on the Internet, 
there is no telling who or what may utilize the original coding for 
new and more devastating attacks upon an industry that is moving 
too slowly in response to these warning signs. 
Risk Based Security states that for 2017, SCADA products only 
accounted for 2% of all reported vulnerabilities.231 In addition, “this 
decline in the number of vulnerabilities found in SCADA products 
seems to reflect the fact that researchers are no longer focusing on 
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V. INTERNET OF THINGS 
Continued rapid technological progress remains central to eco-
nomic prosperity and social well-being, but it is also introducing 
potential new threats. The Internet of Things (IoT) is connecting bil-
lions of new devices to the Internet, but it also broadens the attack 
potential of cyber actors against networks and information. 
 
Daniel R. Coats 
Director of National Intelligence 
    May 11, 2017234 
 
The term “Internet of Things” (IoT) describes “objects embed-
ded with technologies such as microchips, sensors, and actuators 
that often use Internet Protocol and share data with other machines 
or software over communications networks.”235 Recall that the IoT 
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global market spend is estimated to “grow from $591.7 billion in 
2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a compound annual growth rate of 
17%. The installed base of IoT endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion 
in 2014 to more than 25.6 billion in 2019.”236 
A. The Promise of the Internet of Things 
The IoT makes possible a wide assortment of truly wonderful 
benefits for daily life. The IoT is “in your home, in your car and 
phone, and, increasingly, on your body. It’s connecting citizens to 
their cities, linking patients to health services, bringing companies 
in closer touch with their customers and capturing our imagina-
tions.”237 Although most Internet data “currently takes the form of 
text files, messages, audio, photographs, and video files, the IoT 
grabs new and different data, it combines data in different ways and 
it allows humans and machines to gain broader and deeper in-
sights.”238 
The IoT “quite literally means ‘things’ or ‘objects’ that connect 
to the Internet—and each other.”239 Examples are everywhere and 
include airplane engines, e-books, computers, Fitbit devices, home 
heating and air conditioning systems, home security cameras, and 
smartphones. 
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Each of these devices or things has a unique identifi-
cation number (UID) and an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address. These objects connect via cords, wires and 
wireless technology, including satellites, cellular net-
works, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. They use built-in elec-
tronic circuitry as well as radio frequency identifica-
tion (RFID) or near-field communication (NFC) ca-
pabilities that are added later via chips and tags. Re-
gardless of the exact approach, the IoT involves the 
movement of data to enable processes from across 
the room or somewhere on the other side of the 
world.240 
It is the IoT that enables “epidemiologists to track the spread of 
viruses in near real time. A grocery store can analyze how people 
shop and the products they view and buy as an individual walks 
through the store . . . . A pharmaceutical firm can understand con-
sumption patterns in real time.”241 Because of the IoT, “a city can 
crunch data from sensors and other systems to better manage con-
gestion, waste management, utilities, natural resources, and much 
more . . . . The technology brings intelligence and a far greater level 
of insight and understanding to a vast array of physical and virtual 
systems.”242 
B. Unintended Consequences 
The future of the IoT is not all positive. Unintended conse-
quences include the likelihood of “new types of crime, weapons and 
warfare. It could also create significant political and social problems 
by, among other things, contributing to a growing disconnect be-
tween people. It will certainly cause society to more closely examine 
the notion of privacy and security.”243 Indeed, the information-silo 
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or information-bubble phenomenon presents a societal and manage-
ment governance threat.244 
Akamai observed, “The rapid proliferation of IoT devices, pri-
marily in the home environment, adds a . . . layer of problems for 
network defenders. The creation of new features to distinguish one’s 
products in the market is always a driving factor for manufactur-
ers.”245 This is a costly societal problem because “[t]here are far too 
many organizations that consider security to be at the bottom of their 
list of priorities, if they consider it at all.”246 For example, Korean 
appliance manufacturer LG recently attended the Las Vegas Con-
sumer Electronics Show, “where not only was an Internet refrigera-
tor announced, but LG stated that every device it sells in the near 
future will have Internet-connected capabilities. Regardless of LG’s 
success at securing these devices, they are establishing a new stand-
ard feature set, which low-end competitors will move to emulate.”247 
Akamai raises the question, “Does every home need a refrigerator 
that not only takes pictures of its own contents, but also has a built-
in web browser on the front? The market seems to think they do, but 
the security implications are troublesome.”248 
Instances of hackers infiltrating automobiles, baby monitors, 
and video cameras are reported in the popular media.249 With a goal 
of exposing vulnerabilities to manufacturers so that they may im-
prove their products, so-called white-hat hackers have found and re-
ported code weaknesses in IoT-connected medical devices, “includ-
ing insulin pumps, ventilators, and defibrillators.”250 
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stated, “We have seen an ex-
plosion of surveillance technologies, such as drones and mobile de-
vice tracking sensors in retail stores. We have moved from an eco-
system where companies track consumers across websites to one 
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where companies track us across apps and even across devices.”251 
She further warned, “And now, many consumer devices and appli-
ances—from your [F]itbit to your fridge to your thermostat—are si-
lently talking to one another, collecting data, and transmitting that 
information to various third parties.”252 Some may be surprised to 
learn that “even the once private act of reading is generating data 
about us, as e-book companies track not just what we read, but also 
how we read—where we start, what passages we skim, reread, or 
highlight, and whether we actually finish the books we begin.”253 
1. UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY 
The genesis of the term “Internet of Things” is credited to tech-
nology pioneer Kevin Ashton, who reportedly incorporated the term 
in a presentation he made to Proctor & Gamble (P&G) in 1999.254 
Ashton’s idea was to link the Internet with Radio Frequency Identi-
fication (RFID) technology and to interest retail giants such as 
P&G.255 Today’s RFID tags, “can be produced for under a penny 
and are capable of performing real-time, constant data exchange and 
can be read by scanners.”256 It wasn’t until the early 2000s that tech-
nological advances provided a platform for achieving the true po-
tential of Internet-connected devices.257 
2. GROWTH AND IMPORTANCE OF MOBILE 
A single incident responsible for catapulting the IoT into expo-
nential growth is difficult to isolate. However, introduction of the 
Apple iPhone in 2007: 
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was a crystallizing event. It put smartphones into the 
hands of the masses. It put real-time . . . communica-
tion on the map . . . . Consider: In January 2008, Ap-
ple had sold approximately 3.7 million units. By June 
2014, the number had topped 500 million. Today, the 
total number of smartphones in use worldwide is 
somewhere in the vicinity of 1.9 billion. By 2019, 
Sweden telecom firm Ericsson estimates the number 
will exceed 5.6 billion.258 
The explosive growth since 2010 of dynamic IoT devices is 
“based on insights gleaned from the processing of real-time infor-
mation and historical data with minimum human interaction,” and 
results from three main catalysts.259 When combined, three factors 
provided a perfect environment of smart and interconnected devices 
that nurtured the creation of the IoT: 
First, the widespread availability of broadband Inter-
net provided high speed network connectivity that 
enabled devices to communicate with each other 
over a wireless network across large parts of the de-
veloped world. Second, enhanced computational ca-
pabilities enabled the real-time analysis of large 
amounts of unstructured data. 
Third, the decreasing cost of sensors allowed manu-
facturers to add small wireless chips to any device 
for a minor incremental cost.260 
Application of RFID technology is much more than just a tool 
for maximizing profits and reducing costs. Samuel Greengard ob-
served that RFID: 
builds a bridge between the physical world and the 
virtual world. By attaching a small tag to an object 
(or installing a chip into a device)—either a tiny pas-
sive transponder using electromagnetic radiation or a 
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battery powered passive or active tag that relies on 
UHF radio waves—and setting up an RFID reader, 
anything and everything can be connected to the In-
ternet. Today RFID technology is used for toll col-
lections, contactless payment systems, tracking ani-
mals, managing baggage at airports, embedding data 
in passports, following runners in [sic] marathons, 
and tracking golfballs via a smartphone app.261 
3. INDUSTRIAL INTERNET 
Samuel Greengard describes the Industrial Internet as revolving 
“around machines equipped with sensors, thus making them ‘smart.’ 
These devices often serve as the plumbing or IT foundation for the 
IoT.”262 It is the connectivity to sensor technology devices and min-
iaturization that is at the very heart of the Industrial Internet. These 
newly available data points and systems connectivity make possible, 
“things as diverse as geolocation and GPS devices, bar code scan-
ners, thermometers, barometers, humidity gauges, vibration sensors, 
pressure sensors, gyroscopes, magnetometers, cameras, audio and 
video monitors, accelerometers, motion sensors, radar, sonar, and 
lidar” (used by Google to operate its driverless car).263 Key capabil-
ities made possible by the Industrial Internet include: location 
awareness;264 enhanced situational awareness;265 sensor-based deci-
sion analytics;266 automation and controls;267 and a connected mili-
tary.268 
A series of competing protocols and communications technolo-
gies are involved in the contemporary IoT ecosystem. These tech-
nologies include: actuator networks; machine-to-machine (M2M) 
communications; near-field communications (NFC); RFID; and 
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wireless sensor devices and networks.269 Katherine Britton ob-
serves: 
NFC evolved from RFID and is a short-range, low-
power wireless way to transfer small amounts of data 
between devices; NFC technology is built into 20 
percent of mobile phones and most commonly is 
used for mobile payment services such as Google 
Wallet. M2M transmissions refer to direct communi-
cations between machines such as a microchip and a 
microchip scanner, a wearable and a third-party ap-
plication (app), or a wearable and a monitoring hub. 
When machines communicate directly with other 
machines, a device collects information through a 
sensor that can then use a radio transmitter to send 
the data over a wired or wireless network. M2M 
transmissions share information without any special 
configuration or other setup requirements. Cellular 
and mobile data transmission standards such as LTE, 
4G, GSM, and CDMA will connect devices to the 
mobile phone network. Larger “things” will be able 
to communicate via fixed wire lines such as Ethernet 
and optical fiber. Most connections likely will take 
place via wireless networks with chips embedded 
into “things” using standards such as Wi-Fi, Blue-
tooth, ZigBee, Z-Wave, NFC, and RFID in order to 
communicate. The number of installed M2M con-
nections continues to grow due to the declining cost 
of sensors and increased connectivity capabilities 
and data processing power.270 
4. IOT AND HEALTH 
The potential benefits and implications of IoT in medicine de-
livery and health care are enormous. Greengard observes that RFID 
sensors or other “devices implanted in the human body or worn on 
the body could gather data and use the IoT to transmit specific in-
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formation about blood pressure, blood sugar, heartbeat and other vi-
tals while also monitoring medication dosage.”271 Immediately upon 
detecting a problem while monitoring elderly patients, nanobots 
could notify a physician.272 Greengard provides the example of Port-
land’s Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) as a healthcare 
real-time location system (RTLS).273 Accordingly: 
health and research institution tags assets ranging 
from infusion pumps to crutches so that they are easy 
to locate. In addition they are able to track perfor-
mance data related to the device. This approach not 
only saves time that would otherwise be spent hunt-
ing down equipment, it helps ensure that devices are 
in working order. OHSU is now looking into tagging 
patients and clinicians to better understand where 
they spend time, how they move around within the 
facility, and how long patients wait in a room before 
a clinician arrives.274 
5. VALUE PROPOSITION 
The profound healthcare benefits cited above raise the very real 
subjective issue on how to appropriately place a monetary value on 
life. Any such inquiry is far beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, it is apparent that sensor technologies and the Industrial Inter-
net present a potentially exponential technological benefit, perhaps 
spawning “economic activity measuring in the tens of trillions of 
dollars.”275 As Greengard observed, “[e]ven a 1 percent reduction in 
fuel costs or a similar improvement in capital expenditures of system 
inefficiency could produce savings in the tens of billions or hun-
dreds of billions of dollars.”276 
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6. IOT EXPLOITABLE SECURITY FLAWS 
In his prepared remarks before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence in 2017, Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. 
Coats observed: 
The widespread incorporation of “smart” devices 
into everyday objects is changing how people and 
machines interact with each other and the world 
around them, often improving efficiency, conven-
ience, and quality of life. Their deployment has also 
introduced vulnerabilities into both the infrastructure 
that they support and on which they rely, as well as 
the processes they guide. Cyber actors have already 
used IoT devices for distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks, and we assess they will continue. In 
the future, state and non-state actors will likely use 
IoT devices to support intelligence operations or do-
mestic security or to access or attack targeted com-
puter networks.277 
By mid-2016, numerous security flaws in IoT devices were being 
exploited, as demonstrated by the Mirai botnet attacks. 
7. MIRAI BOTNET ATTACKS 
Akamai began tracking a strain of malware during June 2016 
that targets IoT devices and home Internet routers.278 Soon thereaf-
ter, this malware, under the name Mirai, spread worldwide.279 Aka-
mai observed that “Mirai [is] truly exceptional i[n] its use of IoT 
devices and several capabilities that aren’t often seen in botnets: spe-
cifically, Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) based attacks, var-
ying levels of attack traffic customization, and telnet scanning. In 
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addition, it generates its attacks directly . . . .”280 Akamai predicted, 
“Due to the public release of the source code . . . we’re likely to see 
new, more-capable variants of Mirai in the near future.”281         
Moreover, Akamai found: 
Mirai is a botnet that would not exist if more net-
works practiced basic hygiene, such as blocking in-
secure protocols by default. This is not new—we’ve 
seen similar network hygiene issues as the source of 
infection in the Brobot attacks of 2011 and 2012. The 
botnet spreads like a worm, using telnet and more 
than 60 default username and password combina-
tions to scan the Internet for additional systems to in-
fect. The majority of these systems appear to be Dig-
ital Video Recorders (DVRs), IP-enabled surveil-
lance cameras, and consumer routers. Once a system 
is infected, it connects to the command and control 
(C2) structure of the botnet, then continues scanning 
for other vulnerable systems while waiting for attack 
commands.282 
8. KREBS ON SECURITY ATTACKS 
In its Q3 2016 Internet security report, Akamai noted that the 
two highest volume attacks seen as of that date on the Prolexic net-
work consisted of attacks on sites used by security blogger Brian 
Krebbs.283 
Krebs is a security blogger who has been the target of extensive 
large-scale DDoS attacks in response to his reporting.284 According 
to Akamai, Krebs was the target of 269 attacks between 2012 and 
2016.285 Exhibit 4 details the size and timing of the DDoS attacks 
on Krebs on Security during this period, and Akamai noted that a 
series of attacks in September 2016 were the largest DDoS attacks 
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Akamai has defended against.286 Akamai explained that an “ob-
servant reader can probably correlate clumps of attacks to specific 
stories covered by Krebs,” and also opined that “[r]eporting on the 
dark side of cybersecurity draws attention from people and organi-











Before 2016, “the largest DDoS attacks were in the range of 100 
Gbps, growing to 300 Gbps in first half of 2016, and finally into the 
500–600 Gbps range in the third quarter.”289 Exhibit 5 depicts how 
the Mirai botnet produces a specific Domain Name System (DNS) 
query flood. Akamai explained that “this dns query flood can poten-
tially cause more damage than current dns reflection attacks. If a 
targeted dns server is unprepared for a sustained flood of queries 
with high packet rates, dns Water Torture can lead to a denial of 
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Exhibit 5 
Mirai DNS Attack Queries Are Sent from Bots to their Local DNS 






By the first quarter 2017, Akamai detected additional disruptive 
Mirai attacks and observed that “[t]he botnets’ capabilities quickly 
moved into a stage where contention for Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices reduced the size of attacks considerably. While many of the 
largest DDoS attacks observed this quarter were still based on Mirai-
derived botnets, they were not as large as the initial attacks.”292 The 
Marai case study reveals that to be effective, attacks need not be 
particularly big. Akamai stated, “If we consider that many busi-
nesses lease uplinks to the Internet in the range of 1–10 Gbps, any 
attack exceeding 10 Gbps could be ‘big enough’ and more than ca-
pable of taking the average unprotected business offline.”293 In ad-
dition, Akamai warned: 
the effects of IoT are not to be underestimated, and 
the IoT ecosystem has drawn the attention of a wider 
audience. A recent example is malware that compro-
mises Internet-enabled toasters to mine Bitcoins, an 
effort that appears to have been an ineffective proof 
of concept. Another trend is represented by the 
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BrickerBot botnet, which attacks systems exposed 
directly to the Internet with default Telnet passwords 
apparently in an attempt to prevent their use by the 
Mirai botnet. If this botnet is unable to disconnect the 
target device from the Internet, it corrupts the config-
uration, permanently bricking the devices. Neither of 
these examples are major threats, but they do show a 
significant increase in attention from both the hacker 
and security communities. 
There is one factor that seems to be affecting the 
DDoS landscape as a whole: law enforcement. Early 
attacks by the Mirai botnets appear to have been trig-
gered by the announcement of the arrests of two 
teens in Israel who were responsible for the vDos 
botnet—a DDoS-for-hire tool that netted them hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars. More recently, Europol 
coordinated the arrest of 34 individuals across 13 
countries as part of an effort called Operation Tarpit. 
Operations like Tarpit target the largest services re-
sponsible for DDoS attacks directed at banks, gam-
ing companies, and retailers. This can have a signif-
icant effect in reducing the number of attacks on 
these organizations.294 
Efforts to combat these threats are complicated by the fact that 
most of these botnets are discrete code compositions, making for an 
expanding universe of numerous “Mirai-derived botnets using sim-
ilar software, each a small fragment and distinct entity . . . . One 
concern is that a unified command and control (C2) structure could 
emerge . . . . [and] such a super botnet could generate a DDoS attack 
of two Tbps in the near future.”295 Ultimately, “[i]f these networks 
gain unfettered Internet access, the devices could be capable of emit-
ting 20 times more attack traffic than we’ve seen to date.”296 
Europol is credited with coordinating global efforts among the 
international security community to combat Mirai IoT-based botnets 
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including Mirai.297 Akamai cautioned how myopic it is to consider 
Mirai as the only threat.298 “With the release of the source code, any 
aspect of Mirai could be incorporated into other botnets. Even with-
out adding Mirai’s capabilities, there is evidence that botnet families 
like BillGates, elknot, and XOR are mutating to take advantage of 
the changing landscape.”299 As to the future, Akamai urges the im-
portance of recognizing that DDoS and IoT’s other threats “are just 
one aspect of the threat landscape . . . . Organizations may monitor 
the login page logs of their sites, but are they watching the traffic for 
their [application programming interfaces (APIs)]? Site-to-site and 
business-to-business APIs may be a bigger target than most real-
ize.”300 
9. FTC AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
The FTC has begun to address IoT matters that impact consum-
ers in the United States.301 On August 22, 2016, FTC Chairwoman 
Ramirez discussed the important role of the FTC “in empowering 
consumers and ensuring they have control over their personal infor-
mation.”302 Chairwoman Ramirez argued that control may be 
achieved by: 
(1) conducting research to ensure that our policy-
making efforts appropriately address privacy and se-
curity risks as the marketplace evolves; (2) using our 
law enforcement authority to ensure that consumers’ 
choices are honored and that companies safeguard 
the consumer data they collect; and (3) helping spur 
innovation in the creation of tools that help consum-
ers express choices.303 
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One example of such law enforcement authority is the FTC’s 
2017 agreement with VIZIO to settle charges the consumer electron-
ics company collected viewing histories on 11 million smart televi-
sions without consent from users.304 Other FTC actions implicating 
consumer protection have addressed issues such as artificial intelli-
gence;305 blockchain technology;306 and computer routers and cam-
eras.307 For example, the FTC brought an action during 2016 against 
ASUS, a manufacturer of wireless routers.308 In discussing the crit-
ical importance of subjecting IoT devices to pre-launch security test-
ing, Chairwoman Ramirez observed that in the ASUS matter, “we 
alleged that the company’s failure to test its Internet-connected rout-
ers prior to launch contributed to several security breaches. We 
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March 9 on Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain Technology (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-host-fintech-forum-
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charged that ASUS’ actions were both deceptive and unfair, in vio-
lation of Section 5.”309 Other subject areas of focus for the FTC in-
clude connected cars;310 consumer demographics;311 consumer 
scams;312 crowdfunding;313 data breach;314 and data security.315 An 
example of data security enforcement may be found in the FTC’s 
2016 action taken against large advertising network InMobi.316 The 
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FTC charged InMobi with violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
based upon InMobi’s deceptive activities.317 Chairwoman Ramirez 
explained, 
InMobi offered app developers software code to embed in their 
apps to enable them to serve targeted advertising, including adver-
tising based on geolocation. It represented that its software would 
track consumers’ locations only when consumers had granted access 
to that information. The FTC alleged that, in actuality, InMobi had 
used consumers’ geolocation information, which it was able to infer, 
to target ads, even when consumers had not granted geolocation per-
mission.318 
As IoT devices proliferate and as digital threats become increas-
ingly sophisticated, the FTC’s policing of companies’ digital pri-
vacy practices is becoming increasingly pervasive. The FTC’s areas 
of focus have become extremely broad and include a vast array of 
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topics like data security and small businesses;319 digital advertis-
ing;320 drones;321 e-commerce;322 how electricity generation facili-
ties connect to the transmission grid;323 FinTech (artificial intelli-
gence and blockchain);324 health apps;325 home devices;326 identity 
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theft;327 mobile devices;328 online tracking of consumers;329 peer-to-
peer payment systems;330 personal information scams;331 privacy 
and consumer protection;332 ransomware;333 sharing economy plat-
forms;334 smart TV;335 software developer risks;336 software security 
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issues;337 technology used to track consumers across multiple Inter-
net-connected devices;338 and telecommunications regulation.339 
VI. EXPOSURE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CYBER TOOLS 
Not even the highest echelons of government military-grade 
cyber secrets are safe. Over the past two years, multiple parties have 
come into possession of cyber weapons developed and used by the 
U.S. government. Beginning in August 2016, a hacker collective 
known only as “the Shadow Brokers” began releasing and auction-
ing off a set of cyber weapons belonging to the NSA’s highly secre-
tive Office of Tailored Access Operations (TAO).340 Tools released 
by the Shadow Brokers in April 2017 have been implicated in the 
massive ransomware threat known as WannaCry.341 In March 2017, 
Wikileaks released a huge trove of partially redacted hacking tools 
that the organization attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA).342 
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A. NSA and the Shadow Brokers 
In August 2016, the Shadow Brokers announced a putative auc-
tion of a series of cyber tools that the group claimed had been stolen 
from the “Equations Group,” a highly advanced hacking group that 
has been connected with TAO.343 The Shadow Brokers released a 
number of leaks during 2016, including tools aimed at exploiting 
firewalls and network infrastructure engineered by companies that 
include Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet, and Huawei, a Chinese company.344 
At the same time, the group also released another cache of en-
crypted files, claiming they would provide the password to this 
cache to the winner of a Bitcoin auction.345 The fundraising auction 
effort was ultimately a failure.346 On April 8, 2017, the Shadow Bro-
kers publicly released the password to this encrypted cache of 
files.347 
On April 14, 2017, the group released by far the most damaging 
leaks to date, including a Microsoft Windows zero-day exploit 
known as ETERNALBLUE.348 This exploit—despite the fact Mi-
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crosoft issued a patch for it in March 2017, leading some commen-
tators to speculate the company had been tipped off about it349—was 
subsequently used in the massive ransomware attack, known as 
WannaCry, that has infected over a quarter-million machines to 
date.350 The WannaCry virus has since been linked to a hacker group 
affiliated with North Korea, which has been responsible for multiple 
sophisticated attacks, including the 2014 attack against Sony Pic-
tures.351 
B. CIA and Wikileaks 
Yet another installment in the saga of intelligence community 
data hacks is the WikiLeaks exposure of CIA cyber tools during 
March 2017.352 The New York Times reported that the documents 
were “detailed, highly technical catalogue of tools” and “include[d] 
instructions for compromising a wide range of common computer 
tools for use in spying: the online calling service Skype; Wi-Fi net-
works; documents in PDF format; and even commercial antivirus 
programs . . . used by millions of people . . . .”353 WikiLeaks’ initial 
release “of secret C.I.A. material, included 7,818 web pages with 
943 attachments, many of them partly redacted by Wikileaks editors 
to avoid disclosing the actual code for cyberweapons. The entire ar-
chive of C.I.A. material consists of several hundred million lines of 
computer code, the group claimed.”354 
VII.  TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following topics for future research seem to be particularly 
promising: how will the huge amount of data generated from IoT 
devices be preserved? What legal framework is needed to protect 
privacy interests? 
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As billions of IoT sensors and devices come to occupy our phys-
ical environment, Richard S. Whitt warns: 
Many of these systems would be collecting, analyz-
ing, and storing often critical data across entire sec-
tors of the economy. It may be misguided to expect 
that sensors placed in the field will continue provid-
ing useful data for their expected lives of years, even 
decades. Many such devices are doomed to become 
useless “abandonware” after supporting cloud ser-
vices are altered or discontinued. Even those in con-
tinuing operation risk becoming insecure.355 
Many of the issues raised in this article have wide-ranging im-
plications, including on both criminal procedure and substantive 
criminal law.356 How to apply criminal law to malware and digital 
weapons has recently been in the news. A security researcher named 
Marcus Hutchins, who helped prevent the spread of the WannaCry 
ransomware virus in early 2017, was arrested by the FBI on August 
2, 2017.357 The indictment charges Hutchins with “creating and dis-
tributing the Kronos banking trojan,” which is a piece of malware 
that harvests online banking credentials and credit card data.358 The 
indictment discusses that an as-yet arrested unnamed coconspirator 
facilitated selling the malware that Hutchins allegedly created.359 As 
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Professor Orin Kerr has discussed, the case presents a difficult issue 
of criminal law: whether it is a crime to create and sell malware.360 
Of our hyper-connected future world, Samuel Greengard 
warned, “[a]lready, serious concerns exist about whether this tech-
nology will dumb down society, lead to greater inequality, and ex-
pand the digital divide.”361 Greengard raised further questions: 
Could automation cause massive unemployment and 
downward mobility[?] Could it cause more crime or 
new types of terrorism and warfare? How might it 
change the legal system? What about the growing 
problem with digital distraction? . . . How do we ap-
proach security and privacy in an era where almost 
no movement or activity goes unnoticed or unre-
corded?362 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Stuxnet virus represents a paradigm-shifting event. Stuxnet 
reveals to the world that a traditional military is no longer necessary 
to wreak havoc on other countries’ military and civilian infrastruc-
ture installations. The implications for this shift are wide ranging 
and innumerable. 
Yet, the current climate within critical infrastructure industry 
fails to grapple with the ramifications of Stuxnet. Both industry and 
governments are unprepared to respond to a malware infection that 
renders worthless the systems that developed countries rely on for 
necessities as basic as food, water, telecommunications, and elec-
tricity. 
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